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Verifiable Quantum Secure Modulo Summation
Masahito Hayashi and Takeshi Koshiba
Abstract
We propose a new cryptographic task, which we call verifiable quantum secure modulo summation. Secure
modulo summation is a calculation of modulo summation Y1 + . . . + Ym when m players have their individual
variables Y1, . . . , Ym with keeping the secrecy of the individual variables. However, the conventional method for
secure modulo summation uses so many secret communication channels. We say that a quantum protocol for secure
modulo summation is quantum verifiable secure modulo summation when it can verify the desired secrecy condition.
If we combine device independent quantum key distribution, it is possible to verify such secret communication
channels. However, it consumes so many steps. To resolve this problem, using quantum systems, we propose a
more direct method to realize secure modulo summation with verification. To realize this protocol, we propose
modulo zero-sum randomness as another new concept, and show that secure modulo summation can be realized by
using modulo zero-sum randomness. Then, we construct a verifiable quantum protocol method to generate modulo
zero-sum randomness. This protocol can be verified only with minimum requirements.
Index Terms
secure multiparty computation, modulo summation, quantum verification, collusion resistance, selftesting
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Quantum secure modulo summation via secure modulo zero-sum randomness and its verification
Secure multiparty computation is an interesting topic in quantum information processing. Secure modulo sum-
mation is a typical example of secure multiparty computation [1], [2]. Using secure modulo summation, we can
realize visual secret sharing [3], [4]. In this problem, m players have their individual variables Y1, . . . , Ym. The
goal of a typical case is that all players commonly obtain the modulo summation Y1 + . . . + Ym. As the secrecy
condition, Player i’s variable Yi is not leaked to other players even when remaining m− 2 players collude at most,
which is referred as the minimum non-collusion condition. So many existing classical protocols realize this task
by employing so many secret channels. If information on all the secret channels is leaked to the third party, the
secrecy of Player i’s variable Yi does not hold. That is, to guarantee the secrecy, each player needs to verify all
secret channels. One natural method for verification of secret channel is secure communication by using secret key
generated by device independent quantum key distribution [5], [6], [7], [8]. However, even when quantum channels
are available, it requires complicated combinations of use of quantum channels dependently on our assumption.
For example, if Player i wants to verify the secrecy of the key to be shared by two other players, Player i needs
to verify the quantum channel between the two players. For this aim, Player i needs to communicate with the two
players via secret channels. Therefore, Player i consumes so many secret keys shared with the two players. In this
way, the verification of conventional methods are not so simple. Although several quantum protocols for secure
modulo summation are proposed [9], [10], [11], [12], their verification has not been discussed.
The aim of this paper is to provide a construction of a more direct quantum protocol for secure modulo summation
with verification. Moreover, we propose modulo zero-sum randomness as another new concept. In cryptography,
we often focus on cryptographic resources such as secure agreed keys and common randomness: secure agreed
keys play an important role for message authentication and common reference strings are essential for the universal
composable security. Secure modulo zero-sum randomness is a generalization of secure agreed key. Whenm players
exist, secure modulo zero-sum randomness is given as random numbers Xi in F
c
2 for i = 1, . . . ,m as follows. The
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∑m
i=1Xi = 0 holds and any m− 1 variables among X1, . . . ,Xm are independent of each other. Player i
has the randomness Xi and does not know any other random variables except for the above zero-sum condition.
The secure modulo zero-sum randomness is a kind of correlated randomness. Once m players share secure modulo
zero-sum randomness, using broadcast public channel, i.e., a special channel that cannot be altered nor blocked
and can be broadcast to all players, the m players can realize secure modulo summation.
The big advantage of use of quantum system is selftesting. Selftesting offers the verification of quantum
measurement and states only with the minimum assumption [5], [6], [13], [14], [15], [16], [17]. That is, we do
not need to trust any quantum device, and it is sufficient to assume the independence among several measurement
devices. We propose a quantum protocol to generate secure modulo zero-sum randomness as follows. First, the m
players share the GHZ state with respect to the phase basis. Then, they measure their own system with computation
basis. Since the GHZ state can be regarded as a two-colorable graph state, it can be verified by selftesting [13], [16],
[17]. However, all players need to verify it without trusting other players only with the minimum non-collusion
condition. Due to this requirement, we cannot directly apply the existing methods for selftesting of the GHZ state
because they did not care the minimum non-collusion condition. In this paper, we propose a new selftesting protocol
to verify the GHZ state under the minimum non-collusion condition. This protocol is designed so that each player
can verify a certain secrecy criterion of the generated GHZ state when m− 2 remaining players collude at most.
Combining them, we can realize a quantum protocol for secure modulo summation with verification.
B. Application of secure modulo zero-sum randomness
Although secure modulo zero-sum randomness realizes secure modulo summation in the above way and secure
modulo summation can be applied to visual secret sharing [3], [4], secure modulo zero-sum randomness has many
other useful applications as follows. These applications show usefulness of our verifiable quantum protocol to
generate secure modulo zero-sum randomness.
• Application to secret sharing: In the standard setting of multi-party secure computation, many cryptographic
protocols require secure communication channels between any distinct two players [18], [19]. For example,
secure multi-party computation for homomorphic functions can be realized without honest majority, but it
requires so many secure communication channels [1]. Also, any existing secret sharing protocol requires many
secure communication channels [20], [22], [26], [24], [23], [25], [21], [27]. In this paper, using the secure
modulo zero-sum randomness, we propose protocols to realize these tasks without secure communication
channels (but broadcast public channel). That is, based on secure modulo zero-sum randomness, we construct
a protocol for multi-party secure computation for some additively homomorphic functions without honest
majority nor secure communication channels. Also, based on the secure modulo zero-sum randomness, we
construct secret sharing protocols without secure communication channels. We first give a basic protocol for
secret sharing without secure communication channels. Then, by utilizing universal hash functions, we adapt
the basic protocol to a cheater detectable protocol without secure communication channels.
• Application to securely computing additively homomorphic functions: A standard method for multi-party
secure computation requires honest majority or secure communication channels. Another method based on
secure message transmission [28], [29], [30], [31] realizes multi-party secure computation without honest
majority nor secure communication channels. Instead of secure communication channel, we can employ secure
message transmission, which is a cryptographic protocol between two parties, between which there are several
channels but some of them are corrupted, to send messages privately and reliably. Secure message transmission
protocols can simulate a secure communication channel between the two parties. In the standard setting of
perfectly secure message transmission, honest majority over the channels is required. If the broadcast public
channel is available in secure message transmission, then such a barrier can be overcome [32], [33], [34] and
multi-party secure computation can be realized by using secure message transmission with the broadcast public
channel [35]. However, the respective simulations of the secure communication channels are quite inefficient.
To resolve this problem, based on the secure modulo zero-sum randomness, this paper proposes an alternative
method for securely computing additively homomorphic functions. Our protocol uses only broadcast public
channel as well as the secure modulo zero-sum randomness.
• Application to multi-party anonymous authentication: As another application, we propose multi-party
anonymous authentication, which is a new cryptographic task. Consider the case when a certain project requires
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confirming the contents of the project. Additionally, we might require the anonymity for this approval due to
the following reason. This is because if a person disagreeing to the project can be identified, a player might
hesitate to disagree to it even when he/she does not agree on it in his/her mind. In this paper, using secure
modulo zero-sum randomness, we construct a protocol to realize multi-party anonymous authentication without
secure communication channel.
Indeed, secure modulo zero-sum randomness can be generated by multi-party secure computation for modulo
sum. In this sense, the generation of secure modulo zero-sum randomness can be regarded as an equivalent task to
multi-party secure computation for modulo sum. In addition, we also discuss several methods to generate secure
modulo zero-sum randomness.
C. Organization of this paper
This paper is organized as follows. Section II defines a new cryptographic resource modulo zero-sum randomness
and discusses the equivalence to related secure computation protocols. Section III shows that if we are allowed to
use quantum algorithms it is possible to verify that the resource satisfies the property of secure modulo zero-sum
randomness. By combining the results in Sections II and III, Section IV proposes a quantum verifiable protocol
for secure modulo summation. Section V compares our method with other methods. Section VI extends the results
in Section II to secure computation with respect to additively homomorphic functions. Section VII provides secret
sharing protocols without secure communication channels. Section VIII proposes a new cryptographic task multi-
party anonymous authentication, which employs modulo zero-sum randomness. Appendix C gives the generalization
to the case with a general finite filed Fq when we trust our measurement devices.
II. SECURE MODULO ZERO-SUM RANDOMNESS
First, we give the rigorous definition of secure modulo zero-sum randomness for the random numbers Xi ∈ Fc2
with i = 1, . . . ,m. The random numbers Xi ∈ Fc2 with i = 1, . . . ,m is called secure modulo zero-sum randomness
when the following conditions hold.
(1) Modulo zero condition: The relation
∑m
i=1Xi = 0 holds.
(2) Independence condition: Any m − 1 variables among X1, . . . ,Xm are independent of each other and
subject to the uniform distribution.
(3) Secrecy condition: Player i has the randomness Xi and does not know any other random variables except
for the modulo zero condition. Let Wi be the information of Player i except for Xi. Then, the relation
I(X1, . . . ,Xm;XiWi) = I(X1, . . . ,Xm;Xi) holds.
Using modulo zero-sum randomness, we can realize the secure calculation of the modulo sum Y1+ · · ·+Ym as a
function with m inputs Yi ∈ Fc2 without revealing the information for respective inputs. Here, the m inputs are given
by m different players, and it is required to calculate the output without informing their inputs to other players.
It is known that secure multi-party computation for modulo sum is possible without honest majority [1]. That is,
even when the majority of players do not behave honestly, the secrecy of each input can be guaranteed. However, it
requires secure communication channels. When no secure communication channel is available, to realize the above
task only with broadcast public channels, it is natural to employ cryptographic resources.
Now let us define the task of secure modulo summation when player j has the secret input Yj ∈ Fc2 for
j = 1, . . . ,m.
(1) Reliability condition: Any player i must calculate the modulo sum Y1 + · · · + Ym when all players are
honest.
(2) Secrecy condition: Assume that m − 2 players except for Player j collude at most, which is called the
minimum non-collusion condition. Also, their variables Y1, . . . , Ym are assumed to be independent of each
other and subject to the uniform distribution. Then, the variable Xj of player j is independent of the
information Z obtained by the m− 2 colluded players. That is, the relation I(Xj ;Z) = 0 holds.
Indeed, when secure modulo zero-sum randomness X1, . . . ,Xm is shared, the following protocol realizes secure
modulo summation.
Theorem 1: Protocol 1 realizes secure modulo summation.
4Protocol 1 Secure Modulo Sum Protocol from Secure Modulo Zero-sum Randomness
STEP 1: Player i sends the information Zi := Yi +Xi to all players via broadcast public channel.
STEP 2: Each player calculates
∑m
i=1 Zi, which equals
∑m
i=1 Yi.
Proof: Since Reliability condition holds for the equality
∑m
i=1 Zi =
∑m
i=1 Yi, we show only Secrecy condition.
Due to the symmetry, it is sufficient to show the Secrecy condition only for player 1 when m−2 players 3, . . . ,m
collude. The m− 2 players have variables X3, . . . ,Xm, Y3, . . . , Ym, Z1, Z2. Since Y3, . . . , Ym, are independent of
X3, . . . ,Xm,X1 + Y1,X2 + Y2, Y1, we have
I(X3, . . . ,Xm, Y3, . . . , Ym, Z1, Z2;Y1) = I(X3, . . . ,Xm,X1 + Y1,X2 + Y2;Y1). (1)
Since Y2 is subject to the uniform distribution, X3, . . . ,Xm,X1,X2+Y2 are independent of each other and subject to
the uniform distribution. Hence,H(X3, . . . ,Xm,X1+Y1,X2+Y2|Y1) = m log q, which equalsH(X3, . . . ,Xm,X1+
Y1,X2 + Y2). Thus, I(X3, . . . ,Xm,X1 + Y1,X2 + Y2;Y1) = 0.
Indeed, when secure modulo zero-sum randomness X1, . . . ,Xm is shared, the following protocol realizes secure
modulo summation. Further, the discussion in this section can be trivially extended to the case with replacement
of F2 by Zd and Fq.
Protocol 2 Generation of Secure Modulo Zero-sum Randomness from Secure Modulo Summation Protocol
STEP 1: Player i generates the variable Yi subject to the uniform distribution, which is independent of other
variables.
STEP 2: All players calculate the modulo summation
∑m
i=1 Yi by the secure modulo summation protocol.
STEP 3: Player 1 set the variable X1 := Y1 −
∑m
i=1 Yi. Player i set the variable Xi := Yi for i = 2, . . . ,m.
Theorem 2: Protocol 2 realizes secure modulo zero-sum randomness.
Proof: Modulo zero condition follows from the relations
∑m
i=1Xi = Y1 −
∑m
i=1 Yi +
∑m
i=2 Yi = 0.
Independence condition holds as follows. X2, . . . ,Xm are independent of each other and subject to the uniform
distribution because of their definition. Next, we focus on X1 and m−2 variables among X2, . . . ,Xm. As a typical
case, we discuss X1, . . . ,Xm−1. Since Ym is subject to the uniform distribution, Y1 −
∑m
i=1 Yi = −
∑m
i=2 Yi
is also subject to the uniform distribution even when Y2, . . . , Ym−1 are fixed to certain values. Hence, variables
X1, . . . ,Xm−1 are independent of each other and subject to the uniform distribution.
Secrecy condition is shown as follows. To discuss the secrecy of X1, we consider the typical case when Players
2, . . . ,m− 1 collude. Since ∑mi=1 Yi is independent of Y2, . . . , Ym−1,
I
(
X1;X2, . . . ,Xm−2,
m∑
i=1
Yi
)
=I
(
−
m∑
i=2
Yi;Y2, . . . , Ym−1,
m∑
i=1
Yi
)
= I
(
Y1 −
m∑
i=1
Yi;Y2, . . . , Ym−1
∣∣∣∣
m∑
i=1
Yi
)
=I
(
Y1;Y2, . . . , Ym−2
∣∣∣∣
m∑
i=1
Yi
)
= 0. (2)
To discuss the secrecy of X2, we consider the typical case when Players 3, . . . ,m collude. Since
∑m
i=1 Yi is
independent of Y3, . . . , Ym,
I
(
X2;X3, . . . ,Xm,
m∑
i=1
Yi
)
=I
(
Y2;Y3, . . . , Ym,
m∑
i=1
Yi
)
= I
(
Y2;Y1 + Y2 +
m∑
i=3
Yi
∣∣∣∣Y3, . . . , Ym
)
=I
(
Y2;Y1 + Y2
∣∣∣∣Y3, . . . , Ym
)
= 0. (3)
5As another case, we consider the case when Players 1, 3, . . . ,m − 1 collude. Since ∑mi=2 Yi and ∑mi=1 Yi are
independent of Y3, . . . , Ym−1,
I
(
X2;X1,X3, . . . ,Xm−1,
m∑
i=1
Yi
)
= I
(
Y2;−
m∑
i=2
Yi, Y3, . . . , Ym−1,
m∑
i=1
Yi
)
=I
(
Y2;−Y2 − Ym −
m−1∑
i=3
Yi, Y1 + Y2 + Ym +
m−1∑
i=3
Yi
∣∣∣∣Y3, . . . , Ym−1
)
=I
(
Y2;−Y2 − Ym, Y1 + Y2 + Ym
∣∣∣∣Y3, . . . , Ym−1
)
=I
(
Y2;Y2 + Ym, Y1
∣∣∣∣Y3, . . . , Ym−1
)
= 0. (4)
III. QUANTUM PROTOCOL FOR SECURE MODULO ZERO-SUM RANDOMNESS
Now, we propose a direct verifiable construction by using the GHZ state as follows. For this aim, we introduce
the phase basis state. The phase basis {|z〉p}z∈F2 is defined as
|z〉p := 1√
2
∑
x∈F2
(−1)xz|x〉,
where |x〉 expresses the computational basis.
The phase GHZ state |GHZ〉p := 1√2
∑
z∈F2 |z, . . . , z〉p is calculated as
|GHZ〉p = 1√
2m−1
∑
x1,...,xm∈F2:x1+...+xm=0
|x1, . . . , xm〉. (5)
When all the players apply the measurement on the computational basis to the system whose initial state is |GHZ〉p,
Player i obtains the variableXi. Then, the sum ofm outcomes, i.e.,
∑m
i=1Xi is zero, andm−1 outcomes are subject
to the uniform distribution. Hence, these outcomes satisfy the conditions of secure modulo zero-sum randomness.
That is, when the initial state is guaranteed to be |GHZ〉p, it is guaranteed that the outcomes are secure modulo
zero-sum randomness.
When the m players apply Protocol 1 to the generated secure modulo zero-sum randomness, they can realize
secure modulo summation. To verify its secrecy, each player has to verify the generated secure modulo zero-sum
randomness. In secure modulo summation, when we focus on Player i, we assume that m − 2 remaining players
collude at most. Hence, Player i needs to verify that the colluded players has no information with respect to Xi
under this assumption. That is, we assume the following assumption.
(1) Player i’s quantum measurement has no correlation with those of other players.
(2) Remaining players are divided into two groups S1 and S2. Both groups are not empty. There is no
correlation between the two groups S1 and S2.
(3) Player i does not know the separation of remaining players by S1 and S2.
Indeed, when we trust their measurement devices, we can verify the state |GHZ〉p by using the two projections
defined by
P˜1 :=
∑
x1,...,xm:x1+...+xm=0
|x1, . . . , xm〉〈x1, . . . , xm| = 1
2
(I + Z1 · · ·Zm) (6)
P˜2 :=
∑
z
|z, . . . , z〉p p〈z, . . . , z| =
∏
i;i 6=j
1
2
(I + XjXi), (7)
where Z :=
∑
x(−1)x|x〉〈x| and X :=
∑
x |x+ 1〉〈x|. Here, the subscript of Z and X expresses the Hilbert space
to be acted.
Now, we assume that we prepare 2n+1 copies. Then, we randomly choose n copies and apply the test P˜1. Also,
we randomly choose n copies from the remaining n+1 copies and apply the test P˜2. If these tests are passed, the
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MEASUREMENT FOR EACH GROUP
Group Measurements
k-th group Z′j ,X
′
k
m+ k-th group X′j ,X
′
k
2m+ k-th group A(0)′j ,X
′
k
3m+ k-th group A(1)′j ,X
′
k
j-th group Z′j ,Z
′
1, . . . ,Z
′
j−1,Z
′
j+1, . . . ,Z
′
m
m+ j-th group X′j ,Z
′
1, . . . ,Z
′
j−1,Z
′
j+1, . . . ,Z
′
m
2m + j-th group A(0)′j ,Z
′
1, . . . ,Z
′
j−1,Z
′
j+1, . . . ,Z
′
m
3m + j-th group A(1)′j ,Z
′
1, . . . ,Z
′
j−1,Z
′
j+1, . . . ,Z
′
m
Here, k is chosen from 1, . . . , j − 1, j + 1 . . . ,m.
remaining copy can be considered to be close to the true state |GHZ〉p. This discussion can be extended to the
case with a general finite field Fq. Appendix C gives this generalization with a formal statement of this test.
However, when we cannot trust their measurement devices, the above method does not work. We need to employ
the method of selftesting [5], [6], [13], [14], [15], [16], [17]. The following is the protocol to generate secure modulo
zero-sum randomness with the verification by Player i. For this protocol, we prepare the following measurements.
A(k) := (X+ (−1)kZ)/
√
2 (8)
for k = 0, 1.
If they have the system of 4mn+1 copies, it can be verified as Protocol 3. Here, to distinguish the real observable
from the ideal observable, we denote the measured observables by ′.
Protocol 3 Verifiable Generation of Secure Modulo Zero-Sum Randomness for Player j
STEP 1: Prepare the system of 4mn+ 1 copies.
STEP 2: Player i randomly divides the 4mn+1 copies into 4m+1 groups such that the final group is composed
of one copy and the remaining groups are composed of n copies.
STEP 3: Players apply the measurement to the respective groups except for the final group as shown in Fig. I.
STEP 4: Players except for Player j send their outcomes to Player j. Player j checks the following inequalities
for their average values for k = 1, . . . , j − 1, j + 1 . . . ,m.
A[X′jX
′
k] ≥ 1−
c1
n
, A
[
− Z′j
(∑
l 6=j
Z′l
)]
≥ 1− c1
n
, (9)
A
[
A(0)′j
(
X′k −
∑
l 6=j
Z′l
)
+ A(1)′j
(
X′k +
∑
l 6=j
Z′l
)]
≥ 2
√
2− c1√
n
. (10)
Here, A expresses the average of the observed values with respect to the observables inside of the bracket [ ]. If
the above test is passed, Player j considers that the remaining copy is close to the phase GHZ state |GHZ〉p.
STEP 5: Each Player k measures the final group with Z basis, and obtain the value Xk for k = 1, . . . ,m.
Theorem 3: Assume that players are divided into three distinct non-empty groups Player j, S1, and S2. When
groups S1 and S2 do not collude with each other and Protocol 3 by Player j is passed, with significance level α,
Player j finds that
‖PXj ,E − PXjPE‖1 ≤
c0
n1/8
, (11)
where E describes all the information obtained by the group S2 and c0 is a constant dependent on c1 and α.
Theorem 4: When all players are honest and Protocol 3 by Player j is passed, with significance level α, Player
j finds that the obtained distribution PX1,...Xm satisfies
‖PX1,...Xm − PX1,...Xm|ideal‖1 ≤
c′0
n1/8
, (12)
7where PX1,...Xm|ideal is the ideal distribution of secure modulo zero-sum randomness and c
′
0 is a constant dependent
on α and c1.
[Note that the significance level is the maximum passing probability when malicious Bob sends incorrect states
so that the resultant state α does not satisfy Eqs. (11) and (12).]
Proof of Theorem 3: Assume that S1 is composed of j1, . . . , jl. We focus on the quantum system of Player j
and the quantum system of group S1. The latter system is spanned by the basis
|x〉S1 :=
1
2(l−1)/2
∑
xj1 ,...,xjl :xj1+...+xjl=x
|xj1〉j1 · · · |xjl〉jl .
It is also spanned by |z〉S1;p := |z〉j1;p · · · |z〉jl;p = 1√2(|0〉S2 + (−1)z |1〉S1). We define ZS1 := |0〉S1 S1〈0| −|1〉S1 S1〈1| and XS1 := |0〉S1 S1〈1| + |0〉S1 S1〈1|. Similarly, we define ZS2 and XS2 . While the measurement ZS1
can be done by the measurement Zj1 , . . . ,Zjl , the measurement XS1 can be done only by the measurement Xk
for any k ∈ S1. The same observation holds for ZS2 and ZS2 . Therefore, our GHZ |GHZ〉p can be considered as
1√
2
(
∑
z |z〉p|z〉S1;p|z〉S2;p).
When one measures ZS2 , obtains the outcome z, and applies the unitary X
−z
j , the resultant state is the Bell state
1√
2
(
∑
z |z〉j;p|z〉S1;p). When we measure Xj and XS1 to the system in the state 1√2(
∑
z |z〉j;p|z〉S1;p|z〉S2;p), the
measurement outcome does not depend on the measurement outcome of ZS2 . Therefore, we can consider that the
measurements on the j1, j,m + j1,m + j, 2m + j1, 2m + j, 3m + j1, 3m + j-th groups can be considered as the
measurement required in Proposition 5. Now, we denote the real operator on the final group by using ′′. The real
quantum system of Player j, the groups S1 and S2 by Hj , HS1 , and HS2 .
Using Proposition 5, we can guarantee, with significance level α, that there exist constant c2 and isometries
Uj : H′′j →Hj and US1 : H′′S1 →HS1 such that
‖UjX′′jU †j − Xj‖ ≤ c2n−1/4, ‖UjZ′′jU †j − Zj‖ ≤ c2n−1/4, (13)
‖US1X′′S1U †S1 − XS1‖ ≤ c2n−1/4, ‖US1Z′′S1U
†
S1
− ZS1‖ ≤ c2n−1/4. (14)
We apply the same discussion to the case with switching S1 and S2. Then, we can guarantee, with significance
level α, that there exists isometry US2 : H′′S2 →HS2 such that
‖US2X′′S2U †S2 − XS2‖ ≤ c4
√
c1n
−1/4, ‖US2Z′′S2U †S2 − ZS2‖ ≤ c4
√
c1n
−1/4. (15)
We define two projections
P1 :=
∑
x1,x2,x3:x1+x2+x3=0
|x1〉j |x2〉S1 |x3〉S2 j〈x1| S1〈x2| S2〈x3|
=
1
2
(I + ZjZS1ZS2) (16)
P2 :=
∑
z
|z〉j;p|z〉S1;p|z〉S2;p j;p〈z| S1;p〈z| S2;p〈z|
=
1
4
(I + XjXS1)(I + XjZS2) =
1
4
(I + XjXS1 + XjZS2 + XS1ZS2). (17)
Then, we have |GHZ〉p p〈GHZ| = P1P2. Hence, for U = UjUS1US2 , using (16), we have
‖U †P1U − P ′′1 ‖ = ‖P1 − UP ′′1 U †‖ ≤
1
2
(‖Zj − UjZ′′jU †j ‖+ ‖ZS1 − US1Z′′S1U †S1‖+ ‖ZS2 − US2Z′′S2U
†
S2
‖) (18)
‖U †P2U − P ′′2 ‖ = ‖P2 − UP ′′2 U †‖ ≤
1
2
(‖Zj − UjZ′′jU †j ‖+ ‖ZS1 − US1Z′′S1U †S1‖+ ‖ZS2 − US2Z′′S2U
†
S2
‖). (19)
Applying Proposition 3 to P ′′1 and P
′′
2 , with significance level 2α and a constant c
′
2, we have
Trσ(I − P ′′i ) ≤
c′2
n
(20)
8for i = 1, 2. Combining (13),(14), (15), (18), (19), and (20), with significance level 4α, we have
TrσU †(I − |GHZ〉p p〈GHZ|)U
≤TrσU †((I − P1) + (I − P2))U ≤ Trσ(U †(I − P1)U + U †(I − P2)U)
≤Trσ((I − P ′′1 ) + (I − P ′′2 )) + ‖U †P1U − P ′′1 ‖+ ‖U †P2U − P ′′2 ‖
≤2c
′
2
n
+ 3c2n
−1/4. (21)
Hence,
‖σ − U †|GHZ〉p p〈GHZ|U‖1 ≤
√
2c′2
n
+ 3c2n−1/4. (22)
Let P˜Xj ,XS1 ,XS2 ,E be the joint distribution when Players apply the ideal measurements U
†
j ZjUj , U
†
S1
ZS1US1 , and
U †S2ZS2US2 . With significance level 4α, we have
‖PXj ,E − PXjPE‖1 ≤ ‖P˜Xj ,E − P˜XjPE‖1 + ‖P˜Xj ,E − PXj ,E‖1 + ‖P˜Xj − PXj‖1
≤‖σ − U †|GHZ〉p p〈GHZ|U‖1 + 2‖Zj − UjZ′′jU †j ‖
≤
√
2c′2
n
+ 3c2n−1/4 + 2c2n−1/4. (23)
Therefore, with significance level 4α, we have (23). Hence, replacing α by α/4, we obtain the desired statement.
Proof of Theorem 4: We apply Proposition 5 to the case with Xi, Xj , Zi, and Zj for i 6= j. With significance
level α, we can guarantee that there exist a constant c2 and isometries Ui : H′′i →Hi and Uj : H′′j →Hi such that
‖UiX′′iU †i − Xi‖ ≤ c2n−1/4, ‖UjX′′jU †j − Xj‖ ≤ c2n−1/4, ‖UiZ′′iU †i − Zi‖ ≤ c2n−1/4.‖UjZ′′jU †j − Zj‖ ≤ c2n−1/4.
(24)
With significant level (m − 1)α, we have (24) with any i 6= j. Then, using the projections P˜1 and P˜2 defined in
(6) and (7), we have |GHZ〉p p〈GHZ| = P˜1P˜2. Hence, for U = UjUS1US2 , using (16), we have
‖U †P˜1U − P˜ ′′1 ‖ = ‖P˜1 − UP˜ ′′1 U †‖ ≤
1
2
m∑
i=1
‖Zi − UiZ′′iU †i ‖ (25)
‖U †P˜2U − PP˜ ′′2 ‖ = ‖P˜2 − UP˜ ′′2 U †‖ ≤
1
2
∑
i:i 6=j
(‖Zj − UjZ′′jU †j ‖+ ‖Zi − UiZ′′iU †i ‖)
=
m− 1
2
(‖Zj − UjZ′′jU †j ‖+
1
2
∑
i:i 6=j
‖Zi − UiZ′′iU †i ‖) (26)
Applying Proposition 3 to P˜ ′′1 and P˜
′′
2 , with significance level 2α and a constant c
′
2, we have
Trσ(I − P˜ ′′i ) ≤
c′2
n
(27)
for i = 1, 2.
Combining (24), (25), (26), and (27), with significance level (m+ 1)α, we have
TrσU †(I − |GHZ〉p p〈GHZ|)U
≤TrσU †((I − P˜1) + (I − P˜2))U ≤ Trσ(U †(I − P1)U + U †(I − P2)U)
≤Trσ((I − P˜ ′′1 ) + (I − P˜ ′′2 )) + ‖U †P˜1U − P˜ ′′1 ‖+ ‖U †P˜2U − P˜ ′′2 ‖
≤2c
′
2
n
+
m+ 2(m− 1)
2
c2n
−1/4. (28)
9Hence,
‖σ − U †|GHZ〉p p〈GHZ|U‖1 ≤
√
2c′2
n
+
3m− 2
2
c2n−1/4. (29)
When we apply the measurement based on a POVM M = {Mi} to the system whose state is ρ, we denote the
output distribution by PMρ . For any POVM M = {Mi}, we have
‖PMσ − PM|GHZ〉p p〈GHZ|‖1 ≤
∑
i
TrMi|σ − |GHZ〉p p〈GHZ|| = ‖σ − |GHZ〉p p〈GHZ|‖1
≤
√
2c′2
n
+
3m− 2
2
c2n−1/4. (30)
We denote the POVM corresponding to the ideal observables Z1, . . . ,Zm (the real observables Z
′′
1, . . . ,Z
′′
m) by
Mideal (Mreal). When we apply the measurement based on the POVM Mideal (Mreal) to the system whose state
is σ, we denote the output distribution by PMidealX1,...,Xm (P
Mreal
X1,...,Xm
). Since
PMrealX1,...,Xm = P
Mreal
X1
PMrealX2|X1 · · ·P
Mreal
Xm|X1,...,Xm−1 − P
Mideal
X1,...,Xm
, (31)
we have
‖PMrealσ − PMidealσ ‖1 = ‖PMrealX1,...,Xm − PMidealX1,...,Xm‖1
=
m∑
i=1
‖PMrealX1 PMrealX2|X1 · · ·P
Mreal
Xi|X1,...,Xi−1 · · ·P
Mideal
Xm|X1,...,Xm−1 − P
Mreal
X1
PMrealX2|X1 · · ·P
Mideal
Xi|X1,...,Xi−1 · · ·P
Mideal
Xm|X1,...,Xm−1‖1
=
m∑
i=1
‖PMrealX1 PMrealX2|X1 · · ·P
Mreal
Xi|X1,...,Xi−1 − P
Mreal
X1
PMrealX2|X1 · · ·P
Mideal
Xi|X1,...,Xi−1‖1
=
m∑
i=1
max
x1,...,xi−1
‖PMreal
Xi|X1=x1,...,Xi−1=xi−1 − P
Mideal
Xi|X1=x1,...,Xi−1=xi−1‖1
=
m∑
i=1
max
x1,...,xi−1
‖UjZ′′jU †j − Zj‖ ≤ mc2n−1/4. (32)
Since (24) and (27) hold with significance level (m+ 1)α, combining (30) and (32), we have
‖PX1,...Xm − PX1,...Xm|ideal‖1 ≤ ‖PMrealσ − PMideal|GHZ〉p p〈GHZ|‖1
≤‖PMrealσ − PMidealσ ‖1 + ‖PMidealσ −PMideal|GHZ〉p p〈GHZ|‖1 ≤
√
2c′2
n
+
3m− 2
2
c2n−1/4 +mc2n−1/4. (33)
Replacing α by α/(m + 1), we obtain the desired statement.
IV. QUANTUM PROTOCOL FOR SECURE MODULO SUMMATION
Combining the above two methods, the following protocol realizes secure modulo summation with verification.
Protocol 4 Verifiable Quantum Secure Modulo Summation
STEP 1: m players generate 4m2n+ 1 copies of the state |GHZ〉p.
STEP 2: Each player randomly chooses distinct 4mn copies and apply Steps 2, 3, and 4 of Protocol 3. If all the
tests are passed, they proceed to the next step.
STEP 3: All the players apply the measurement of the computational basis to the remaining one copy. The outcomes
X1, . . . ,Xm are used as secure modulo zero-sum randomness.
STEP 4: Player i sends the information Zi := Yi +Xi to all players via broadcast public channel.
STEP 5: Each player calculates
∑m
i=1 Zi, which equals
∑m
i=1 Yi.
Due to Theorem 3, Player j can verify the secrecy of Xj under the minimum non-collusion condition for
j = 1, . . . ,m. That is, Secrecy condition holds. Also, Theorem 4 guarantees Reliability condition. Therefore, we
can consider that Protocol 4 is a verifiable quantum secure modulo summation.
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V. COMPARISON WITH OTHER METHODS
A. Other quantum methods for secure modulo summation
Using quantum systems, the references [9], [10], [11], [12] proposed a protocol to securely calculate modulo
summation, which is essentially equivalent to the generation of secure modulo zero-sum randomness. However, they
did not propose a method to verify the secrecy and the correctness of their computation. In our method, instead of
a direct computation of secure summation, we propose a method to generate secure modulo zero-sum randomness
with a protocol (Protocol 3) to verify the secrecy and the correctness.
For example, the method proposed by the paper [11] is summarized as follows. First, m − 1 players shares
the GHZ state |GHZ〉 := 1√q
∑
x∈F2 |x, . . . , x〉. Second, Player i applies ZXi and sends the system to Player m,
where Z :=
∑
x∈F2 ω
tr x|x〉〈x| and i runs from 1 to m− 1. Third Player m measures the total system by the basis{
1√
q
∑
x∈F2 ω
− tr xz|x, . . . , x〉
}
x
. Finally, Player m sends the outcome to all other players.
Since the quantum state used in their method is the GHZ state, it can be verified in the same way as in Section
III. In this case, Player i for i 6= m can verify the GHZ state in the same way as Protocol 3. However, when Player
m wishes to verify the secrecy of Ym, the protocol is not so simple. In this case, in the verification stage, Player m
needs to ask each player to make measurements and send back the outcomes. Further, these communications need
to be secret, which requires additional quantum communication. Due to this problem, our method is more efficient
than the combination of the method by [11] and the verification given in Protocol 3.
B. From secure agreed random numbers
We discuss a method to generate secure modulo zero-sum randomness from secure agreed random numbers.
Secure modulo zero-sum randomness among m players can be generated from several pairs of secure agreed
random numbers as follows. Assume that Player i and Player i + 1 share the secret random number Zi ∈ Fc2.
Also, we assume that Player m and Player 1 share the secret random number Zm ∈ Fc2. Then, Player 1 puts the
random variable X1 := Z1 − Zm, and Player i puts the random variable Xi := Zi − Zi−1. The resultant variables
X1, . . . ,Xm satisfy the condition
∑m
i=1Xi = 0 and the independence between any n− 1 variables of them.
Indeed, secure agreed random numbers can be generated by using quantum key distribution. This method generate
secure modulo zero-sum randomness if all the players are honest. However, each player does not have a method to
verify whether other players are honest. Therefore, even when we apply the randomness generated by this method
to Protocol 1, the obtained method does not satisfy the condition of verifiable secure modulo summation
However, when Player j wishes to verify the generated secure modulo zero-sum randomness, he/she needs to
verify the secrecy of all the secret random numbers. In this case, these secret random numbers need to be generated
by quantum communication with selftesting. When a part of the secret random number is Player j, the secrecy can
be directly verified by Player j. However, when the secret random number is not shared by Player j, Player j needs
to ask both players sharing the secret random number to make measurement and send the outcome to Player j.
The required communication between Player j and each player should be secret, which required another quantum
communication and selftesting. Therefore, we can say that our method is more efficient than the above method.
C. Asymptotically approximated generation from information theoretical assumption
Secure modulo zero-sum randomness amongm players can be generated from information theoretical assumption
with asymptotically negligible error. A sequence of random variables Xi,n ∈ Fcn2 is called secure modulo zero-sum
randomness with asymptotically negligible error when
D(PX1,n,...,Xm,n , PX˜1,n,...,X˜m,n) → 0 (34)
where D is the variational distance and X˜1,n, . . . , X˜m,n is a secure modulo zero-sum randomness among m players.
Here, limn→∞ cnn is called the generation rate.
For example, secure modulo zero-sum randomness among m players can be generated with asymptotically
negligible error when the multiple access channel satisfies a certain condition and they can use the multiple access
channel n times. The detail construction will be given in [36]. Also, with asymptotically negligible error, it can be
extracted from the n-fold independent and identical distribution of a certain joint distribution of m random variables
Z1, . . . , Zm only with broadcast public communication when the joint distribution satisfies a certain condition [36].
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However, this method requires noisy classical channel whose noise level is known to all players. Unfortunately,
there is no method to guarantee such a noisy classical channel. Therefore, this method cannot be considered as a
protocol to realize verifiable secure modulo summation.
VI. SECURE MULTI-PARTY COMPUTATION OF HOMOMORPHIC FUNCTIONS
In the discussions in Sections VI, VII, and VIII, we assume that q is a power of 2 because the finite field Fq
can be regarded as an ℓ-dimensional vector space over F2. Hence, a c-dimensional vector space over Fq can be
regarded as Fcℓ2 . That is, a secure modulo zero-sum randomness Xi ∈ Fcq with i = 1, . . . ,m is defined as a secure
modulo zero-sum randomness Xi ∈ Fcℓ2 with i = 1, . . . ,m. However, the discussions in Sections VI, VII, and VIII
can be extended to the case with a general finite field Fq because these discussions hold by replacing F2 with Fq.
The discussion in the previous section can be extended to a homomorphic function with respect to addition. Let
f : (Fcq)
m → Fcq be an additively homomorphic function whose value can be determined by a linear combination
of inputs. That is,
f(Y1, . . . , Ym) = f˜(α1Y1 + · · ·+ αmYm), (35)
where α1, . . . , αm are all in F
c
q and f˜ : F
c
q → Fcq is some function. For the security, we also assume that f is
sensitive in the sense that the image of f distributes uniformly at random when some argument is chosen uniformly
at random and the other arguments are fixed.
Protocol 5 Secure Computation for an additively homomorphic function f
STEP 1: Player i computes Zi := f˜(Xi + αiYi) and distributes it to all the other players via public channel.
STEP 2: Each player collects all Z1, . . . , Zm and computes
∑m
i=1 Zi.
The task can be realized in Protocol 5, which employs secure modulo zero-sum randomness Xi ∈ Fcq for
i = 1, . . . ,m and the broadcast public channel. That is, a player sends a message via the public channel, any
other users can receive the same message. The security is defined in terms of the real/ideal paradigm of the
universal composability [37], [38]. We will consider the security in the (Fpub,Fmzsr)-hybrid model, where Fpub is
a functionality of the broadcast public channel and Fmzsr is a functionality of the modulo zero-sum randomness.
So, it is enough to provide simple definitions (without interaction with the adversary) of the functionalities.
Functionality Fpub (Simple Form)
Upon receiving (Send, sid , R, x) from Party i, Fpub outputs (Sent, sid , i, R, x) to all parties in R, where sid is
a session id and R is a list of receivers of a message x.
Functionality Fmzsr (Simple Form)
Fq,cmzsr proceeds as follows, when parameterized by the alphabet size q and the length c.
Upon receiving (Request, sid) from Party i, Fq,cmzsr generates modulo zero-sum randomness X1, . . . ,Xm, each in
F
c
2, satisfying the modulo zero-sum condition and the independence condition and outputs (Response, sid , i, j,Xj)
to Party j for each j = 1, . . . ,m.
Now, we are ready to give definitions of the correctness and the privacy.
Definition 1: Let f(x1, . . . , xm) be an m-party functionality and π be an m-party protocol. We say that the
protocol is correct if honest parties do not get incorrect values in the presence of the adversary.
Remark. If π is correct, then the following holds.
1) The protocol aborts whenever it detects a cheating behavior of the adversary, or
2) honest parties must get the correct values if π does not abort.
Definition 2: Let f(x1, . . . , xm) be an m-party functionality and π be an m-party protocol. We say that the
protocol τ -securely computes f with perfect privacy if there exists a simulator S for which the following holds.
For any subset of corrupted parties T ⊆ {1, . . . ,m} at most size τ by the adversary A and every m-tuple of inputs
x = (x1, . . . , xm), two probability distributions Idealf,S(x) and Realπ,A are identical.
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1) Idealf,S(x) is defined as
(S(T,x[T ],y[T ]),y[T¯ ]),
where y = f(x), T¯ = {1, . . . ,m}\T , and v[T ] denotes the sub-vector (vj)j∈T for a vector v = (v1, . . . , vm).
This is the joint distribution of the simulated view of the corrupted parties together with outputs of the honest
parties in an ideal implementation of f .
2) Realπ,A is defined as
(Viewπ,T (x),Outputπ,T¯ (x)),
where Viewπ,T (x) is the joint view of the parties in T by executing π on input x and Outputπ,T¯ (x) is the
output that π delivers to the honest parties in T¯ .
Remark. If f is a single-valued function and the functional value is required to be shared among all the parties,
then we consider that y = (y, y, . . . , y), where y = f(x).
Theorem 5: Let f be an additively homomorphic function of the form Eq.(35). Then, Protocol 5 is correct in the
semi-honest model.
Proof: Since the adversary does not alter Zi due to the condition of broadcast public channel, each player can
collect the correct values Z1, . . . , Zm. Then each player computes
m∑
i=1
Zi =
m∑
i=1
f˜(Xi + αiYi) = f˜
(
m∑
i=1
Xi +
m∑
i=1
αiYi
)
= f(Y1, . . . , Ym).
This concludes the proof.
Remark. If we allow a malicious adversary A, which can send a fake value for Zi for Party i corrupted by A. In
this case, the correctness of Protocol 5 does not hold. A naive application of universal hash functions, which will
be discussed in Section VII, does not work. In this paper, our concern is to demonstrate that the modulo zero-sum
randomness contributes to simple cryptographic construction and thus we do not consider the correctness in the
malicious model any more.
Theorem 6: Let f be an additively homomorphic function of the form Eq.(35). Then, f can be (m− 1)-securely
computed with perfect privacy by Protocol 5 in the (Fpub,Fmzsr)-hybrid model.
Proof: For the proof, we follow the convention in [39]. First, we assume that the adversary A collapses Players
1, . . . ,m − 1. Since Protocol 5 is essentially non-interactive, what the adversary A can do is just sending a fake
value Z ′i instead of Zi for Player i. Then, Realπ,A (with help of Fpub and Fmzsr) is described as
{X1, . . . ,Xm−1, Y1, . . . , Ym−1, Z ′1, . . . , Z ′m−1, Zm, f(Y1, . . . , Ym)},
since A can compute Z1, . . . , Zm−1 and also f(Y1, . . . , Ym) from Z1, . . . , Zm. Now, we construct a simulator S
which takes X1, . . . ,Xm−1, Y1, . . . , Ym−1 as input with help of Fmzsr. S can compute Z ′1, . . . , Z ′m−1 as A does.
Also S can send Y1, . . . , Ym−1 to the functionality f to get f(Y1, . . . , Ym). Then S can compute Zm as
Zm = f(Y1, . . . , Ym)−
m−1∑
i=1
f˜(Xi + αiYi).
Thus, we can say that Idealf,S is identical to Realπ,A.
Next, we consider the case that A collapses Players 1, . . . , k, where k < m − 1. In this case, we can similarly
construct a simulator S . The difference is that S can compute Z = Zk+1 + · · · + Zm instead of Zm. Since f˜ is
sensitive, we can take random values from the image of f˜ for Zk+1, . . . , Zm−1. S can set Zm = Z − (Zk+1 +
· · · + Zm−1). This is also a perfect simulation of Realπ,A.
Remark. In the statement of Theorem 6, we do not clearly mention that the corruption is static or adapive. Since
Protocol 5 is essentially non-interactive, we do not distinguish static adversaries from adaptive ones.
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VII. SECRET SHARING WITHOUT SECURE COMMUNICATION CHANNEL
A. Basic Protocol
While there are many secret sharing protocols, they require secure communication channel in the dealing phase
[20]. Now, we propose a secret sharing protocol without use of secure communication channel. Assume that there
are m players and Player 1 has a secret message Y ∈ Fcq. Our task is the following without use of secure
communication channel. Player m can decode the secret message Y only when all the m − 1 players except for
Player 1 collaborate for the decoding. A conventional secret sharing protocol does not achieve this requirement
because it employs secure communication channels in the dealing step.
When the m players have secure modulo zero-sum randomness Xi ∈ Fcq for i = 1, . . . ,m, this task can be
realized as Protocol 6.
Protocol 6 Secret Sharing without secure communication channel
STEP 1: [Dealing] Player 1 sends the information Z := X1 + Y to Player m via broadcast public channel.
STEP 2: Players 2, . . . ,m− 1 send their randomness X2, . . . ,Xm−1 to Player m via broadcast public channel.
STEP 3: [Reconstruction] Player m reconstructs the original information Z +
∑m
i=2Xi, which equals Y .
B. Cheater Detectable Protocol
However, this protocol cannot detect whether Players 2, . . . ,m − 1 send incorrect information. To resolve this
problem, we propose the following protocol (Protocol 7), which employs secure modulo zero-sum randomness
Xi ∈ Fcq for i = 1, . . . ,m. In this protocol, the information Y transmitted from Player 1 is a non-zero element of
Fq. Hence, Y is subject to the uniform distribution on Fq \ {0}. When the size of information to be transmitted
is large, we use algebraic extension. We identify the vector space Fcq with the finite filed Fq′ with q
′ = qc by
considering algebraic extension.
Protocol 7 Cheater Detectable Secret Sharing without secure communication channel
STEP 1: Players 2, . . . ,m− 1 send their randomness X2, . . . ,Xm−1 to Player m via broadcast public channel.
STEP 2: [Dealing] Player 1 sends the information Z := X1Y to Player m via broadcast public channel.
STEP 3: [Reconstruction] If Z 6= 0, Player m defines Y ′ := −Z(∑mi=2Xi)−1. If Y ′ belongs to Fq ⊂ Fq′ , Player
m considers that there is no cheating and Y ′ equals the original information Y . If Y ′ does not belong to Fq ⊂ Fq′ ,
Player m considers that there is cheating and discard Y ′.
Now, we analyze the performance of Protocol 7. First of all, we consider the security of Protocol 7 and the
success probability of the reconstruction of Protocol 7 when all the players are honest.
Proposition 1: Suppose that all the players are honest in Protocol 7. Then, Protocol 7 has the perfect secrecy
and the success probability of the reconstruction is 1− q−c.
Proof: If X1 = 0 then Z = 0. In this case, Y
′ = 0. This is different from Y , which is non-zero. If X1 6= 0
then Y ′ = Y and the reconstruction succeeds. Since the probability that X1 = 0 is q−c, the success probability is
1− q−c. For the security, we assume that Players 2, . . . ,m collude to get X2+ · · ·+Xm−1. If X1 = 0 then Z = 0.
Z does not include any information on Y . If X1 6= 0 then Z looks random. What they can do for guessing X1
is just a random choice. This implies that Xm also looks random. Since Y = Y
′ = −Z(∑mi=2Xi)−1 and both its
numerator and denominator are non-zero, what they can do for guessing Y is also a random choice. Thus, Protocol
7 has the perfect secrecy.
If Players 2, . . . ,m − 1 use the information in the dealing phase, these players can make a cheat. Hence, it is
essential to put the transmission of the random variables X2, . . . ,Xm−1 before the dealing phase. As an attack, we
assume that at least one of Players 2, . . . ,m − 1 makes Player m to decode a different information from Y that
belongs to Fq. We call this attack the modification attack. For simplicity, we consider the case when all of Players
2, . . . ,m− 1 collude for the modification attack.
Theorem 7: When all of Players 2, . . . ,m− 1 in Protocol 7 collude for the modification attack, they succeed the
attack with probability q−1q′−1 .
14
Proof: When X1 6= 0, to succeed this attack, the sum V ′ of variables sent from Players 2, . . . ,m−1 to m needs
to satisfy the condition −X−11 (V ′+Xm) ∈ Fq \{1}. When we denote the sum
∑m−1
i=2 Xi by V , the above condition
is equivalent to the following condition. There exists an element A(6= 1) ∈ Fq such that V ′ − V −X1 = −AX1,
i.e., V ′ = V + (1 − A)X1. Since X1 is subject to the uniform distribution on Fq′ \ {0}, the variable (1 − A)X1
is subject to the uniform distribution on Fq′ \ {0}. Since the number of A(6= 1) ∈ Fq is q − 1, the probability to
satisfy the condition required to V ′ is q−1q′−1 .
Remark. Regardless of the modification attack (in the setting of Theorem 7), Protocol 7 maintains the perfect
secrecy as discussed in the proof of Proposition 1.
Indeed, there exist so many secret sharing protocols with dishonest players. Some of them can identify the cheating
players [21], [22], [23], [24], [25], [26], [27]. However, all the existing protocols require secure communication
channels in the dealing phase. The advantage of this protocol is unnecessity of secure communication channels due
to use of secure modulo zero-sum randomness.
VIII. MULTI-PARTY ANONYMOUS AUTHENTICATION
A. Basic Protocol
Suppose that a certain project written as the variable Y ∈ Fdq requires the approvals from all of m players.
Our requirement is the following. We verify that all m players approve the project by confirming the contents Y .
Additionally, we require anonymity for this approval.
We consider the following naive protocol by using secure modulo zero-sum randomnessXi ∈ Fcq for i = 1, . . . ,m.
If Player i agrees on the project, he/she sends his/her random variable Xi to the other players via broadcast public
channel. Otherwise, he/she sends another variable to the other players via broadcast public channel. Then, each
player calculates the sum of the received variables and his/her own variable. If the sum is zero, the project can be
considered to be approved.
However, this protocol has the following problem. There is a possibility that Player i incorrectly receives a
different information Y ′ from Y as the project. This case is called a mismatched recognition. In fact, when the
secrecy of the information Y is required, it might be distributed via secure communication channel priorly. This
assumption is natural because it is usual to require the secrecy of the contents of the project. Hence, we need to
be careful about a mismatched recognition. That is, we need to verify that each player makes the decision based
on the correct information Y .
To prevent a mismatched recognition, as illustrated in Fig. 1, attaching the message authentication protocol [40],
[41] to information Y , we propose the following protocol as Protocol 8. As a preparation of Protocol 8, from secure
modulo zero-sum randomness Xi ∈ Fcq for i = 1, . . . ,m, we generate an e × d Toeplitz matrix Ti and a variable
Ai ∈ Feq, where we choose the integers e and d to satisfy 2e+ d− 1 = c. (Note that Toeplitz matrices can be used
universal hash functions. You may consult with a textbook [42].) Indeed, since an e× d Toeplitz matrix Ti needs
e+ d− 1 elements of Fq, the pair of Ti and Ai requires 2e+ d− 1 = c elements of Fq. In the following, we also
assume that the variable Y ∈ Fdq describing the project has been distributed to all the players priorly while there is
a possibility of a mismatched recognition.
Protocol 8 Multi-party Anonymous Authentication
STEP 1: [Voting] Player i sends Bi ∈ Feq to the remaining players via broadcast public channel. If Player i agrees
on the project described by Y , he/she chooses Bi as TiY + Ai. Otherwise, he/she chooses Bi subject to the
uniform distribution on Feq.
STEP 2: [Verification] Each player calculates
∑n
i=1Bi. If the sum is zero, the project can be considered to be
approved.
B. Analysis with honest players
When all the players send TiY + Ai based on the same variable Y , we have
∑n
i=1Bi =
∑n
i=1 TiY + Ai =
(
∑n
i=1 Ti)Y + (
∑n
i=1Ai) = 0Y + 0 = 0 and all the players find that all of them approve the project written by
Y . Hence, for security analysis, we need the analysis on the case when at least one player disagrees on the project
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Fig. 1. Mismatched recognition.
and/or at least one player recognizes a different information from Y . For this aim, we have the following two
theorems.
Theorem 8: When at least one Player i′ disagrees on the project, the probability of
∑n
i=1Bi = 0 is q
−e.
Proof: Since Bi′ is subject to the uniform distribution on F
e
q, the probability of
∑n
i=1Bi = 0 is q
−e.
Theorem 9: When all the players agree on the project and at least one Player i recognizes the information Yi
that is different from the information Y1 recognized by Player 1, the probability of
∑n
i=1Bi = 0 is q
−e.
This theorem ensures that if the project is approved by this protocol, all the players confirm no mismatched
recognition.
Proof: Assume that players i1, . . . , ik recognize the information Yi1 , . . . , Yik that is different from the infor-
mation Y1 recognized by Player 1. Also assume that other players recognize the same information Y1 recognized
by Player 1. We define the variable Vij := Yij − Y1 for j = 1, . . . , k. Then, we have
n∑
i=1
Bi =
k∑
j=1
TijVi,j . (36)
Since Vi,j 6= 0, the variable TijVi,j is independently subject to the uniform distribution on Feq. Hence,
∑k
j=1 TijVi,j
is also subject to the uniform distribution on Feq. Therefore, we obtain the desired statement.
C. Analysis with malicious player
Now, we consider the case with a malicious player. When malicious Player j makes rushing, Player i can realize
the situation
∑n
i=1Bi = 0 by sending −
∑
i 6=j Bi unless all the players do not approve the same variable Y . Hence,
when we employ Protocol 8, we need to trust all the players. To avoid the rushing attack, we propose another
protocol (Protocol 9), which trusts Player 1.
Protocol 9 Secure Multi-party Anonymous Authentication
STEP 1: [Voting] Player i sends Bi ∈ Feq to Player 1 via broadcast public channel. If Player i agrees on the project
described by Y , he/she chooses Bi as TiY +Ai. Otherwise, he/she chooses Bi subject to the uniform distribution
on Feq.
STEP 2: [Verification] Player 1 calculates
∑n
i=1Bi, where B1 := T1Y + A1. If it is zero, the project can be
considered to be approved.
STEP 3: [Notification] Player 1 sends the above result to other players.
Now, we consider the following type of malicious player. Assume that malicious Players l, . . . ,m want to make
the following situation by colluding together. Here, for the notational convenience, we assume that Players l, . . . ,m
are malicious. Players 1, . . . , l − 1 consider that the project is described by another information Y1, . . . , Yl−1, and
they approve this project based on this incorrect information. Then, Player 1 announces that all the players approve
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the project based on the same information while they are not the same. For this kind of attack, we have the following
theorem.
Theorem 10: In Protocol 9, malicious Players l, . . . ,m succeed the above attack with probability q−e.
Proof: To realize this situation,
∑m
i=l Bi needs to be −
∑l−1
i=1 TiYi +Ai, which is calculated as
−
l−1∑
i=1
TiYi +Ai =−
l−1∑
i=2
Ti(Yi − Y1)−
l−1∑
i=1
TiY1 +Ai
=−
l−1∑
i=2
Ti(Yi − Y1) +
m∑
j=l
TjY1 +Aj .
We define the set {i1, . . . , ik} := {i ∈ [2, l− 1]|Yi 6= Y1}. Then, Ti1(Yi1 −Y1), . . . , Tik(Yik −Y1) are independently
subject to the uniform distribution on Feq. Since Ai is subject to the uniform distribution on F
e
q for i = 2, . . . , l− 1,
Bi is independent of TiYi. Hence, Players l, . . . ,m cannot obtain any information TiYi from Bi for 2, . . . , l − 1.
Thus, letting
V := (B2, . . . , Bm−1, Tl, . . . , Tm, Al, . . . , Am, Y1, . . . , Yl−1),
we obtain
I(−
l−1∑
i=2
Ti(Yi − Y1) +
m∑
j=l
TjY1 +Aj ;V )
=I(−
l−1∑
i=2
Ti(Yi − Y1);V ) = 0. (37)
Since −∑m−1i=2 Ti(Yi−Y1) is subject to the uniform distribution, Players l, . . . ,m can make the situation∑ni=1Bi =
0 with probability q−e.
IX. CONCLUSION
We have proposed a new concept of secure modulo sum randomness and a quantum protocol to generate it.
We also have constructed its verification protocol that works even with untrusted measurement devices. Then,
combining them, we have proposed a verifiable quantum protocol for secure modulo summation for m players even
with untrusted measurement devices. This protocol guarantees secrecy for each player even when m − 2 players
collude at most. However, since we employ selftesting, our method works only with F2. In order to extend our
method to the case with a general finite field Fq, we need to develop selftesting in q-dimensional system with
operators X and Z. This is an interesting future study.
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APPENDIX A
CLASSICAL RANDOM SAMPLING
We consider n + 1 binary random variables X1, . . . ,Xn+1 taking values in {0, 1}. We randomly choose n
variables among X1, . . . ,Xn+1 and observe them. We denote the remaining variable by Y . Let Z be the number
of 1 among observed variables.
Lemma 3 of [17, Appendix C] is rewritten as follows.
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Proposition 2: With significance level α, we have For any constants c1, p∗ and α, there exists a constant c2 such
that with significance level α, we have
p∗ − c2√
n
≤ Pr
(
Y = 1
∣∣∣p∗ − c1√
n
≤ Z
n
≤ p∗ + c1√
n
)
≤ p∗ + c2√
n
(38)
When p∗ is zero, we prepare a different type of evaluation as follows.
Proposition 3: With significance level α ≥ k+1n+1 , we have
Pr(Y = 1|Z ≤ k) ≤ k
α(n + 1)
+
1− α
α(n − k) . (39)
That is, for any constants c1 and α, there exists a constant c2 such that with significance level α, we have
Pr
(
Y = 1
∣∣∣Z
n
≤ c1
n
)
≤ c2
n
(40)
Proof: We denote the number of 1 among X1, . . . ,Xn+1 by the variable X. We assume that P (X = x) = Px.
Then, we have
Pr(Z = z, Y = y) = Pz+y
(
n
z
)
(n+1
z+y
) . (41)
That is,
Pr(Z = z, Y = 0) = Pz
n− z + 1
n+ 1
(42)
Pr(Z = z, Y = 1) = Pz+1
z + 1
n+ 1
(43)
Thus, we have
Pr(Z = z) = Pz
n− z + 1
n+ 1
+ Pz+1
z + 1
n+ 1
. (44)
Hence,
Pr(Z ≤ k, Y = 1) =
k∑
z=0
Pz+1
z + 1
n+ 1
, (45)
and
Pr(Z ≤ k, Y = 1)
Pr(Z ≤ k) =
∑k
z=0 Pz+1
z+1
n+1
(
∑k
z=0 Pz) + Pk+1
k+1
n+1
(46)
Since 1n+1 ≤ . . . ≤ kn+1 ≤ k+1n+1 and 1 ≥ k+1n+1 , we have
max
(Pz)
n+1
z=0
{ ∑k
z=0 Pz+1
z+1
n+1
(
∑k
z=0 Pz) + Pk+1
k+1
n+1
∣∣∣( k∑
z=0
Pz) + Pk+1
k + 1
n+ 1
≥ α
}
= max
p
{(1− p) kn+1 + p k+1n+1
(1− p) + p k+1n+1
∣∣∣(1− p) + pk + 1
n+ 1
≥ α
}
(47)
The condition (1− p)+ p k+1n+1 ≥ α is equivalent to the condition 1−α ≥ p(1− k+1n+1) = pn−kn+1 , which is rewritten
as (1− α)n+1n−k ≥ p. Under this condition, we have
(1− p) kn+1 + p k+1n+1
(1− p) + p k+1n+1
=
k
n+1 + p
1
n+1
(1− p) + p k+1n+1
≤
k
n+1 + (1− α)n+1n−k 1n+1
α
=
k
n+1 +
1−α
n−k
α
=
k
α(n + 1)
+
1− α
α(n− k) . (48)
Combining (47) and (48), we obtain the desired statement.
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APPENDIX B
SELFTESTING OF BELL SATE
To discuss the verification of the GHZ state, we review the existing result for selftesting of the Bell state by
[17]. To fit our use, we consider the case when the Bell state is given as 1√
2
(|00〉p + |11〉p).
We choose a sufficiently large Hilbert spaces H′′1 and H′′2 so that the state on the composite system is the pure
state |ψ′′〉. Let X′′i , Z′′i , A(0)′′i , A(1)′′i be operators on Hi for i = 1, 2.
Proposition 4: When
〈ψ′′|X′′1X′′2|ψ′′〉 ≥ 1− ǫ, 〈ψ′′| − Z′′1Z′′2|ψ′′〉 ≥ 1− ǫ, (49)
〈ψ′′|A(0)′′1(X′′2 − Z′′2) + A(1)′′1(X′′2 + Z′′2)|ψ′′〉 ≥ 2
√
2− ǫ, (50)
there exist a constant c3 and isometries U1 : H′′1 → H1 and U2 : H′′2 → H2 such that the isometry U = U1U2
satisfies
‖UX′′1U † − X1‖ ≤ c3ǫ1/2, ‖UZ′′1U † − Z1‖ ≤ c3ǫ1/2 (51)
‖UX′′2U † − X2‖ ≤ c3ǫ1/2, ‖UZ′′2U † − Z2‖ ≤ c3ǫ1/2. (52)
Eq.(51) follows from Proposition 1 of [17]. While Eq.(52) does not appear in Proposition 1 of [17], it can be
shown by using (E40) and (E41) of Lemma 9.
Now, we apply Proposition 4 to the case when we prepare 6m + 1 copies of the initial state and split them
randomly into 6 groups and one final copy. The procedure is described as follows and is denoted by Protocol 10:
Protocol 10 Selftesting of Bell state
STEP 1: Randomly divide 6m+1 blocks into 6 groups, in which, the 1st - 6th groups are composed of m blocks.
STEP 2: Measure X′1, Z
′
1, A(0)
′
1, A(0)
′
1, A(1)
′
1, A(1)
′
1 on the system H′1 for the 1st - 6th groups.
STEP 3: The corresponding measurements on H′2 for the 6 groups are X′2, Z′2, X′2, Z′2, X′2, Z′2.
STEP 4: Based on the above measurements, we check the following 3 inequalities for 6 average values:
A[X′1X
′
2] ≥ 1−
c1
n
, A[−Z′1Z′2] ≥ 1−
c1
n
, (53)
A[A(0)′1(X
′
2 − Z′2) + A(1)′1(X′2 + Z′2)] ≥
√
2− c1√
n
, (54)
Here, the average value in (54) is calculated from the outcomes of the 3rd - 6th groups.
We apply Conditions (53) and (54) to Propositions 2 and 3. Since c2n ≤ c2√n , combining Proposition 4, we obtain
the following proposition.
Proposition 5: For significance level α and a constant c1, there exists a constant c4 to satisfy the following
condition. When the test given in Protocol 10 is passed, we can guarantee, with significance level α, that there
exists an isometries U1 : H′′1 →H1 and U2 : H′′2 →H2 such that the isometry U = U1U2 satisfies
‖UX′′1U † − X1‖ ≤
c4
n1/4
, ‖UZ′′1U † − Z1‖ ≤
c4
n1/4
(55)
‖UX′′2U † − X2‖ ≤
c4
n1/4
, ‖UZ′′2U † − Z2‖ ≤
c4
n1/4
. (56)
APPENDIX C
EXTENSION OF QUANTUM PROTOCOL FOR SECURE MODULO ZERO-SUM RANDOMNESS TO CASE WITH Fq
Now, we extend our quantum protocol for secure modulo zero-sum randomness to the case with Fq. The following
discussion assumes trusted measurement devices. Our protocol with untrusted measurement devices cannot be
extended to the case with Fq.
When we employ a general finite field Fq, the phase basis {|z〉p}z∈Fq is defined as [43, Section 8.1.2]
|z〉p := 1√
q
∑
x∈Fq
ω− tr xz|x〉,
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where |x〉 expresses the computational basis, ω := exp 2πip and tr y for y ∈ Fq is TrMy where My denotes the
multiplication map x 7→ yx with the identificiation of the finite field Fq with the vector space Ftp. Then, the phase
GHZ state |GHZ〉p := 1√q
∑
z∈Fq |z, . . . , z〉p is calculated as
|GHZ〉p = 1√
qm−1
∑
x1,...,xm∈Fq:x1+...+xm=0
|x1, . . . , xm〉. (57)
When all the players apply measurement on the computational basis and the initial state is |GHZ〉p, the sum of m
outcomes is zero and m − 1 outcomes are subject to the uniform distribution. Hence, these outcomes satisfy the
conditions of secure modulo zero-sum randomness. That is, when the initial state is guaranteed to be |GHZ〉p, it
is guaranteed that the outcomes are secure modulo zero-sum randomness.
When we trust measurement devices, we can employ the following protocol to verify the state |GHZ〉p.
Protocol 11 Verifiable Generation of Secure Modulo Zero-Sum Randomness
STEP 1: [Phase basis check] They prepare the system of 2n + 1 copies. They randomly choose n copies, and
apply the measurement of the phase basis. If their outcomes are the same, the test is passed.
STEP 2: [Computational basis check] They randomly choose n copies, and apply the measurement of the
computational basis. If the modulo sums of their outcomes are zero, the test is passed.
STEP 3: [Generation] They apply the measurement of the computational basis to the remaining one copy. The
outcomes are used as secure modulo zero-sum randomness.
Theorem 11: Assume that α > 12n+1 in Protocol 11. If the test is passed, with significance level α, we can
guarantee that the resultant state σ on each remaining system satisfies
Trσ|GHZ〉p p〈GHZ| ≥ 1− 1
α(2n + 1)
. (58)
[Note that the significance level is the maximum passing probability when malicious Bob sends incorrect states
so that the resultant state α does not satisfy Eq. (58).] The proof of the theorem is given below. From the theorem
and the relation between the fidelity and trace norm [40][(6.106)], we can conclude the verifiability: if they passed
the test, they can guarantee that
‖σ − |GHZ〉p p〈GHZ|‖1 ≤ 1√
α(2n + 1)
(59)
with significance level α. Therefore, when Pideal is the ideal distribution of secure modulo zero-sum randomness
and Preal is the real distribution obtained via the measurement with respect to the computation basis, we have
‖Preal − Pideal‖1 ≤ 1√
α(2n + 1)
. (60)
Proof: We choose a new coordinate x¯1, . . . , x¯m as x¯1 = x1+. . .+xm and x¯i = xi for i = 2, . . . ,m. We denote
the unitary corresponding to this coordinate conversion by U . When a matrix D is applied in the computation basis,
the conversion on phase basis is given by (D−1)T . Since



1 0
1 1
...
. . .
1 0 1


−1

T
=


1 −1 · · · −1
1 0
. . .
0 1

 , (61)
we have
U |GHZ〉p = |0〉|0, . . . , 0〉p. (62)
We denote the projection to U †I ⊗ |0, . . . , 0〉p p〈0, . . . , 0|U and U †|0〉〈0| ⊗ I⊗m−1U by P˜1 and P˜2, respectively.
Then, we find that
P˜1P˜2 = |GHZ〉p p〈GHZ|. (63)
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Also, we find that P˜1 and P˜2 are the projections to the subspaces accepting the phase basis check and the
computational basis check, respectively.
We randomly choose one remaining system. LetA be the random permutation of P˜⊗n1 ⊗P˜⊗n2 ⊗(I−|GHZ〉p p〈GHZ|),
which expresses the event that they accept the test and the state on the remaining system is orthogonal to the state
|GHZ〉p p〈GHZ|. We define the projection P¯i := P˜i − P¯0, where P¯0 := |GHZ〉p p〈GHZ| for i = 1, 2. Also, we
define the projection P¯3 := I−|GHZ〉p p〈GHZ|− P¯1− P¯2. Then, we have 4 orthogonal projections P¯0, P¯1, P¯2, P¯3.
Then, we have
A =
∑
v∈{0,1,2,3}2n1+1
C1(v)
C2(v)
P¯v, (64)
where P¯v , C1(v), and C2(v) are defined by using the number Ni(v) of i in v as
P¯v := P¯v1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ P¯v2n1+1 (65)
C2(v) :=
(
2n1 + 1
N0(v)N1(v)N2(v)N3(v)
)
(66)
C1(v) :=
{
v′
∣∣∣∣∣ P¯v′ appears in P˜
⊗n
1 ⊗ P˜⊗n2 ⊗ (I − |GHZ〉p p〈GHZ|),
v′ is given as a permutation of v
}
. (67)
Then, we find that the maximum eigenvalue of A is 12n+1
1. Since we have ‖A‖ ≤ 12n+1 , any initial state ρ satisfies
TrρA ≤ 12n+1 .
Now, we assume that the probability accepting the test is less than α. Then, under the condition that they accept
the test, the probability of the event orthogonal to the state |GHZ〉p p〈GHZ| is upper bounded by 1α · 12n+1 . Hence,
we obtain the desired statement.
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